



Olympic
Security
1976

Ontario
Provincial
Police

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Olympic Security 1976


Ontario
Provincial
Police

Commissioner
H. H. Graham

Deputy Commissioner
J. L. Erskine

Deputy Commissioner
L. R. Gartner





Preface



This book is not a complete history of the security for the Olympic Games — nothing of the sort could possibly be attempted in such small compass; rather, it is a brief report concerning the planning and implementation of security measures adopted by the Ontario Provincial Police Force for the sailing events of the XXI Olympiad at Kingston, Ontario. The report is designed to record, in-depth, the contribution and participation of the Ontario Provincial Police Force within the overall security program for the 1976 Olympics.

While this report is not intended to supplement a training manual or in itself be a training manual, it may be of assistance to those persons involved in a security program of similar magnitude in the future.

This report also includes a brief description of the Royal Family Visit which coincided with Olympic events at Kingston.



H. H. Graham

Commissioner
H. H. Graham




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Introduction



Every four years amateur athletes from nations around the world compete in a sports spectacle called the Olympic Games. These games are the oldest athletic competition in recorded history. Because this is Canada's first involvement as an Olympic host country, let us pause briefly to review the history of this ancient spectacle.

While some scholars believe the games were staged much earlier than documented history, the traditional date of the first Olympic Games is placed at 776 B.C. History records athletic contests being held in a number of Greek city states. The city state known as Olympia was the most celebrated one from which the modern name has evolved.

With the decline of the city states after 300 B.C. and the eventual conquest of Greece by Rome in 146 B.C., the true spirit of the games disappeared.

The Roman Emperor Nero, who was a poor athlete, entered the games as a charioteer. Good athletes fearing what might happen to them should they win, withdrew and in effect allowed Nero to become an Olympic winner.

Eventually men and animals were killed for others' amusement and the games became shows rather than athletic contests. The Greeks loved to participate. The Romans preferred to be spectators. The true purpose of glorifying the outstanding achievements of the individual competitor was lost. However, in spite of this long decline, the games survived 12 centuries. Finally in 393 A.D. the Christian Emperor Theodosius abolished them because they had become "pagan-like demonstrations".

Fifteen hundred years passed. In 1896 Baron Pierre de Coubertin of France helped organize a renewal of the Olympic games which were held appropriately in Athens, Greece. The games have been held every four years since then with the exception of

the war years — 1916, 1940 and 1944.

As an organized competitive sport, yacht racing began in England in 1812 with the formation of the Royal Yacht Club. International yacht racing is said to have started in 1851 with a competition between 14 British yachts and the schooner 'America'. The American schooner won. The team dedicated the victory trophy as a permanent international award to be known as the "America's Cup."

At the Paris Olympics in 1900 Olympic yacht racing made its first appearance as an open class competition. In open class competition there was no restriction on size; consequently, a system of handicaps was devised to equalize the differences among yachts. Gradually the large expensive yachts gave way to smaller and less expensive craft where the strength and skill of the crew were the main factors determining victory. Today only yachts of the same class compete against each other in the Olympic Games.


In 1972, political tensions between the Arab nations and Israel erupted during the Olympic Games in Munich, Germany. Eight Arab terrorists entered the Olympic Village and kidnapped eleven members of the Israeli team. During a gun battle with German police, five of the kidnappers and 10 of the Israeli hostages were killed.

While the memory of this tragedy lingers in the hearts of people throughout the world, it is imprinted in the minds of all security personnel who now or in future years will be involved with the protection of athletes at the games.


Planning

In considering the accomplishments of sound security for the sailing events of the '76 Olympics, tribute must be paid to the thorough and constructive planning which was the basis for this success. This security achievement was even more noteworthy since it took place at an international event in the midst of multi-national tensions and conflict.

Security planning for this event was far more complex than could ever be envisaged. The many hours expended and problems encountered by personnel from the agencies involved could never be totally recounted; however, it is hoped that this brief account will provide an insight into the complexities of this mammoth task.



Commissioner M. J. Nadon
Royal Canadian Mounted Police



Chief Harold Adamson
Metropolitan Toronto Police

Initial stages


In late 1973 the Province of Ontario became aware of its responsibility for those portions of the games of the XXI Olympiad which would take place during the summer of 1976 in Ontario. Yachting events would be held on Lake Ontario, off Kingston, while soccer elimination events would take place at Lansdowne Park in Ottawa and Varsity Stadium, Toronto.

Obviously, security for these events was of paramount importance, and while the larger police forces of Toronto and Ottawa would be capable of meeting these security demands, the smaller, but nonetheless efficient Kingston Police Force was not capable of meeting the entire security requirements for the yachting events. Therefore, the City of Kingston requested assistance in the form of manpower and material from both the federal and provincial governments. Both governments responded by designating the Department of National Defence, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Ontario Provincial Police Force as security forces for the Kingston activities.

Security organizers soon realized that extensive planning and implementation would be required to provide that level of security which the participant nations, and indeed, the whole world, would expect. Conse-



Commissioner H. H. Graham
Ontario Provincial Police



General J. A. Dextraze
Chief of Defence Staff



Chief L. Seguin
Ottawa City Police



The late Chief R. Smith
Kingston City Police

quently the Ontario Provincial Police Force appointed Staff Superintendent J. S. McBride to represent the Force in the initial stages of planning. These early stages included meetings with appointed representatives of the Kingston Police Force (KPF), the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). It was from these early meetings that the committee responsible for security planning was formed, entitled the "Chief Security Committee — Kingston Activities" (CSC-KA). This was the first of many committees and sub-committees formed not only at Kingston, but also at Ottawa, Toronto and within the Provincial Government.


Appointment of the Provincial Coordinator for Security

While the Chief Security Committee was responsible for security planning, ultimate responsibility for the safety of athletes, support staff and Olympic sites rested with the Solicitor General of Ontario, The Honourable John P. MacBeth, Q.C. Therefore at the request of Deputy Solicitor General, A. A. Russell, Q.C. Commissioner H. H. Graham of the Ontario Provincial Police appointed Assistant Commissioner K. W. Grice as the "Provincial Coordinator for Security" in Ontario.

This particular appointment provided first, a link for communications



*The Honourable John P. MacBeth, Q.C.
Solicitor General — Ontario.*



*A. A. Russell, Q.C.
Deputy Solicitor General — Ontario*

so that the Coordinator could report directly to the Office of the Solicitor General and second, a centre for total organizational control. From this centre, the coordinator could monitor and alter, if necessary, the efforts of the separate security forces.

During the operational phase total responsibility for security rested with the Provincial Coordinator who was the link with government in the event of crises which, by their very nature, might demand provincial or federal resolution. This appointment also required the coordinator to be a member of the "Senior Olympic Security Forces Committee" in Montreal which was responsible for the overall security of the 1976 Olympics.



*Assistant Commissioner K. W. Grice
Provincial Coordinator for Security — Ontario.*



*Staff Superintendent J. S. McBride
Assistant Provincial Coordinator for Security — Ontario.*



Chief Security Committee — Kingston Activities. (L. to R.) Superintendent G. Keast — OPP, Superintendent S. Yelle — RCMP, Colonel D. Ells — DND, Staff Superintendent J. S. McBride — OPP, Secretary — M. Skinner, Assistant Commissioner K. W. Grice — OPP, Inspector T. Fowler — Kingston Police Dept., Commander H. Davis — DND, and G. Day — Security Liaison Officer.

Jurisdictional guidelines

As the role of the CSC-KA developed, one of the first tasks encountered was the establishment of jurisdictional guidelines. After many meetings, plans evolved which clearly identified for each security force whether its duties were of a primary or a supportive nature.

Since public safety is the direct responsibility of police forces, the involvement of the Canadian Forces, Department of National Defence, (DND), was primarily supportive in nature. Specifically, the Canadian Forces provided assistance at Kingston in the form of personnel and materiel which were utilized on the Olympic race course, at the Olympic Village, the residence of Olympic officials and various vital points, such as hydro and public utility installations. Canadian Forces also protected VIP's, escorted athletes, secured local airspace and patrolled the border with RCMP officers. As an added safeguard to the overall plan, provision was made for a stand-by force to be deployed, if required, at the request of the Security Coordinator.

The RCMP's involvement in security at Kingston was primarily directed to four areas: border security, security of VIP's, security of athletes at the Olympic race course on Lake Ontario and "intelligence" gathering.

The Kingston Police Force was not only responsible for law enforcement within the city, but also for the security of the athletes between the Olympic Village and the Olympic Harbour.

The Ontario Provincial Police Force was responsible for athlete and site security at the Olympic Village, the Olympic Harbour and the corridor between the Olympic Harbour and the Olympic race course. In cooperation with the Canadian Forces, the Force was also responsible for the security of "vital points" — points which, if damaged or destroyed, could vitally affect the games.

Obviously, security for this international event was both widespread and force-integrated. To achieve the overall goal of protecting more than

500 athletes and support staff, along with several vital sites, a total co-ordination of effort was to be the predominant characteristic of the Ontario Security Forces plan.


The planning role of Security Branch

The Security Branch of the Ontario Provincial Police and other Ontario security forces specialists performed several key tasks throughout the planning stages. Their duties which encompassed security, intelligence, contingency planning, force deployment and training require thorough description for an appreciation of the overall security achievement at Kingston.

Vital points

Beginning in the early summer of 1974 and continuing through April, 1976, the Security Branch of the OPP and security specialists from the RCMP and the Kingston Police Force conducted a series of studies which were referred to as Vital Point Surveys.

These surveys examined various hydro, communications, and public utility installations as well as the many buildings which would be used for accommodation, offices and operation sites by athletes, officials of the Olympic Organizing Committee and security personnel.



Bell Communications Tower — One of several 'Vital Points' in Kingston area.

HMCS Nipigon



To demonstrate the vastness of these particular surveys, a total of 31 separate surveys were conducted, all of which were necessary for sound security planning.

General security measures

This area of planning, which occurred during the period September, 1974 to May, 1976, was concerned with several security measures. Besides identifying and acquiring several pieces of specialized equipment, security personnel also established security procedures. These procedures governed athlete escorts, security of the accreditation system and the physical security requirements for the Olympic Harbour and the Olympic Village such as fencing

and lighting.

Planners in this area were also responsible for setting up procedures for access and spectator control at the Village and the Harbour, as well as contributing general recommendations to the Chief Security Committee on all aspects of security relating to the athletes.

Intelligence planning

The role of "intelligence" in its broadest application is to gather, collate and disseminate information on a variety of subjects.


During the planning stages, the gathering of information was an integral part of the planning process. Its importance cannot be overly stated since the criteria for many decisions

were, in a very real sense, based on information received from various agencies.

To provide this service, security specialists of the OPP and RCMP were in constant touch with policing agencies at home and abroad, identifying threats which were potentially dangerous to athletes, sites and the general population.

As an added feature to the whole "intelligence" gathering system five OPP "intelligence" units were formed from the plainclothes personnel of the Force's Special Services Division. These units' main tasks were to monitor, gather and disseminate facts relating to the local scene which when analyzed, might affect security procedures at Kingston.

PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATIONAL CHART 1976 OLYMPIC GAMES



Contingency planning

As a defence against unpredictable circumstances which could endanger the entire security program, the security forces devised a variety of strategies commonly referred to as "contingency plans". In a broad sense these plans were alternatives for stabilizing perilous situations and restoring normalcy.

The methods and procedures of these plans were established by a sub-committee which consisted of OPP Security Branch personnel and representatives from the RCMP, DND, and KPF.

Post orders

Once the areas of responsibility were defined by the Chief Security Committee — KA, specific security posts relating to the vital points were identified. These posts were examined very carefully and a compilation of duties and responsibilities for the separate security forces was established. The duties and responsibilities of the Ontario Provincial Police security force were then catalogued and published in a book called "Post Orders".

Upon completion of Post Orders, positions requiring OPP personnel and civilian staff were submitted to

Field Division for scheduling and staffing.


Security planning for Olympic Village and Olympic Harbour

While security planning was needed for all areas relating to the sailing events, it was of vital importance for the Village and the Harbour. Since athletes and their support staff would spend most of their time in either of these places, these two strategic sites would most likely be vulnerable to acts of aggression. To appreciate the security problems facing the planning committee an examination of the physical characteristics and overall purposes of these sites needs to be considered.

The Olympic Village consisted of four dormitories normally used by students attending Queen's University. The buildings, Leonard Hall, Donald Gordon/Brockington House, Morris Hall and MacNeil House are located on what is known as Leonard Field covering a small city block. The main purpose of the Village was to house the athletes and support staff who would be participating in the yachting events. Its resources included kitchens, recreation areas and laundry facilities.

The Olympic Harbour, also known as Portsmouth Harbour, consisted of three buildings and a modern docking capability for more than 250 boats.


The main purpose of the harbour complex was to provide berthing facilities and a centre of operations for the yachting events. Other features of this complex included areas for sail and hull measuring, repairing, and sail drying. Located on the roof of the first floor of the main building was a public promenade, a restaurant and offices. The public promenade and dining areas of the restaurant were unique in that they were non-security areas within a maximum security compound. Because a high degree of security had to be maintained in order to prevent a Munich-type disaster, several protective measures were instituted at both the Village and the Harbour. The



Village was completely enclosed by a ten-foot fence and appropriate lighting was installed. Access points to the Village were limited and entrance would be gained only when proper accreditation was presented to security personnel. Due to the unique position of the Harbour, fencing and lighting were only required on the west and north sides. The east side was bounded by Kingston Penitentiary and the south, by Lake Ontario. As with the Village, entrance to the Harbour would be gained following conformity to the accreditation program.



The Olympic Village



The Olympic Harbour

Water security planning

Since the actual sailing events would take place seven miles offshore, planners had to provide security systems for the Olympic Race Site, to-and-from the Race Site and the Olympic Harbour. Obviously this was a huge task and could only be effected through the integrated efforts of the Canadian Forces, RCMP and OPP. Therefore, in December, 1974, a Water Safety Subcommittee was formed, consisting of members and advisors from the three security forces. The express purpose of this subcommittee was to establish methods and procedures that would guarantee the safety of the competitors while on the Olympic race course and the corridor between the race course and the Olympic Harbour.

Early in the planning stage the Water Safety Sub-committee determined distinct job specifications and areas of responsibility for each security force.

The Navy element of the Canadian Forces would act as a support force to both the RCMP and OPP. Assistance would be granted in the form of personnel and equipment from Maritime Command.

Three destroyer escorts, the H.M.C.S. Saguenay, H.M.C.S. Nipigon and H.M.C.S. Annapolis would be supplied. Only one of these destroyers would be deployed in support of security at any one time and anchored in the middle of the race site. From this strategic position planners now envisaged the destroyer as a "command post" for area security vessels. Because of its size and electronic capabilities, the ship would also serve as a deterrent for would-be intruders.

The RCMP was given responsibility for securing the perimeter of the race site. By using 28 watercraft of varying sizes, they would prevent non-accredited vessels from entering the race site. In each case their boats

were equipped with appropriate weaponry for the task. In some cases, a Canadian Forces member was assigned to these vessels.

The task of providing security for the Olympic Harbour, the corridor from the Harbour to the race site, and the water outside the periphery of the race site became the responsibility of the Ontario Provincial Police.

An important feature of the water security program was the addition of two New York State Troopers. These Troopers were aboard RCMP and OPP vessels which were located near the Olympic race course. Jurisdiction, thus, could be maintained should security vessels be required to pursue intruders into American waters.

Airspace security

In order to secure the airspace in and around Kingston, the Ministry of



Force SCUBA divers preparing for dive off Kingston.



Harbour patrol checking boats for correct registration.



One of several RCMP boats used for water security.



OPP security boats with HMCS Saguenay in background.

Transport established a ten nautical-mile radius Positive Control Zone (PCZ) for aircraft. This zone was centred on Simcoe Island, (excluding the area north of Highway 401 and south of the Canada/United States border) and capped at 5,000 feet. The Ministry of Transport shared policing responsibilities with the DND for air traffic. All traffic had to comply with PCZ orders. Within PCZ an Olympic Special Procedures Area (up to 2,000 feet) was also established to restrict all flights other than OPP, RCMP and DND over the race course, the Olympic Village and the Olympic Harbour.

Task performance in this area was the responsibility of the 10th Tactical Air Group Detachment, Kingston. This unit was formed from elements of the 427th Tactical Helicopter Squadron normally based at C.F.B. Petawawa.

Communications

In the broadest sense of the word a communications unit serves as the nervous system of an organization. It conveys raw data to appropriate centres where that data can be co-ordinated, analyzed, made the basis for sound decisions, and relayed to points where action can be implemented. Ultimate tests for a communications centre must include speed, reliability and coverage.

Olympic security planners took a vital interest in the scope and quality of their communications. As the entire security force was in reality an aggregate of several separate security agencies, information transmission had to include both internal and external capabilities. Should the nerve centre fail to function, the entire security operation would be jeopardized.

The Communications Branch of the Ontario Provincial Police Force used the most up-to-date equipment available. This equipment included C.P.I.C., teletype machines, fixed and mobile radios, paging systems and telephone installations which were interfaced with the communication facilities of the other participating agencies.

General Headquarters Operations Room

Patterns emerging from terrorist confrontations throughout the world show that terrorist groups invariably make demands which can only be resolved at the highest government level. Negotiating officials must be aware of all the attendant circumstances so they can act quickly and decisively to prevent chaos and loss of life. This information can only come from security personnel.

To facilitate this process channels of communication had to be established, in the form of an operations centre. This would allow government officials and security personnel to meet and decide on courses of action. Therefore, the OPP created an Operations Room at General Headquarters in Toronto. Manned on a 24-hour basis and supervised by members of the Special Services Division, this centre was equipped with various pieces of electronic equipment and direct telephone links with Federal and Provincial Government offices. Included in the communications network were the operational sites in Kingston and Montreal, as well as numerous police agencies.



The Operations Room was the decision-making area for both security and government when interaction be-

tween the Provincial and Federal Governments was necessary at the Ministerial level.

The accreditation system

Since it is virtually impossible to provide top security without using some means of controlling admission to secure areas, the Olympic Organizing Committee (COJO) devised an accreditation system whereby security personnel could check each and

every person seeking entrance to Olympic sites. Identity cards, often bearing the signature and photograph of the bearer, were issued to all athletes, members of security forces and other officials. The passes were made on Canadian banknote paper, complete with planchettes and special printing to deter production of facsimiles. OPP and RCMP forces were responsible for the security of the accreditation system.



Security Pass



Competitor's Pass

Allocation of resources, selection and training of personnel

While the highly functional characteristics of our Force are reflected in the effective utilization of its resources, a major request for assistance at the 1976 Olympics would be a demanding one, taxing the resources of our organization to the fullest. Full co-operation from every member and civilian on the force would be essential to accomplish our security goals at Kingston.

When the Security Branch conducted manpower studies, they found that at least 340 officers would be required to fulfill the position descriptions at Kingston. These position descriptions called for trained personnel in the following capacities: administrators; intelligence personnel; hostage negotiators; press liaison officers; TRU teams; communication experts; bomb disposal squads; marine boatmen and divers; security squads for the Olympic Village and the Olympic Harbour; athlete escorts; crowd control units; quick response teams and civilian staff including clerks, stenographers, drivers and mechanics.

Allocation of resources

Before selected personnel could become functional in the security operations, support equipment had to be allocated. This included transporta-

tion such as: cruisers, vans, motorcycles and boats; and specialized equipment such as: radios, armament, helicopter, diving gear, crowd control materials and bomb disposal tools. Most of these materiels would be used on a day-to-day basis while the remainder would be held in reserve to meet contingency plans.

Selection of personnel

Because the security operation would demand a great effort from every member who would eventually participate, security planners decided that volunteers would be asked to fill requirements at hand. It was felt that the overall effectiveness of the operation would be enhanced if those who participated were there of their own volition. It seemed that volunteers — through interest — would show a greater commitment to the task ahead.

Obviously the volunteer aspect was only one criterion used, because the actual selection process had to consider the fact that no district or detachment could be overly taxed and still maintain a high level of policing in its area. Selection of personnel, therefore, was spread over 106 detachments in 16 districts and all 11 branches of General Headquarters.

Due to the sensitivity of the operation, the selection committee looked for specific qualities among the candidates. Of great importance were

individual characteristics such as tact, diplomacy and overall appearance. Due to this being an international event, language skills were also a selection criterion.

Finally, selection in some cases was based on specific need. It was evident that certain highly trained specialists within the Ontario Provincial Police would be required. These specialists included hostage negotiators, security personnel, bomb disposal experts, pilots, divers, TRU team members, motorcycle dispatch riders and some civilian staff possessing specialized skills.

OPP planners consider this selection process proved most successful when considering the overall achievement of this Force, in both an isolated task situation and in a joint-force operation.

Training

After defining security objectives, designating jobs required, and selecting appropriate personnel the security planning committee faced the next obstacle — training.

The OPP was about to embark on a mission which required hundreds of skills to meet day-to-day operational needs. At the same time the Force had to be prepared to deal effectively with events which might disrupt the games. Thorough training was to be an integral part of preparation.



OPP boat used for water security.



Force helicopter — a resource which proved most useful for security operations.

Crowd control

While the prime responsibility of any policing agency is the protection of life and property and the preservation of peace, there is perhaps no greater challenge to a law enforcement agency than an encounter with a large group of impulsive people. Because an event like the Olympics can provide a forum for various groups to express themselves to an international audience, crowd control became an extremely important facet of training.

All personnel at the field level underwent crowd control training prior to the Kingston activities. Crowd control training stressed three principles — capability, skill and impartiality.

Because job descriptions for the security program were mainly of a static nature, planners saw the availability of an emergency pool of personnel as a prime concern. A "Quick Response Team" was created which received extra training in crowd control at CFB Kingston.

Firearms

Training in the use of firearms has always been an integral part of an OPP officer's training. This practice has, without doubt, provided the officer with the judgement, constraint and accuracy, whereby he has been able to cope more effectively with his varied experiences. The Olympic detail provided an area where any number of situations could arise which might have demanded the use of firearms. With this in mind, all officers attending the Kingston activities received added training in the care, handling and use of firearms.

Scuba

From the ranks of the professionally trained OPP Scuba Divers strategically located throughout the province, four members were selected for further training to enable them to perform tasks at Kingston which they had not encountered before.

These training sessions took place at Shearwater Naval Base, Halifax and Geneva Park, near Orillia. Training at Shearwater centred around two areas

— learning to recognize underwater explosive devices and evacuation procedures. At Geneva Park, team unification required each diver to familiarize himself with standard search techniques, common signals, general team practises and the use of specialized equipment.

TRU Teams

In 1975, Commissioner H. H. Graham authorized the formation of specially trained tactics and rescue units or TRU Teams. This decision was made following studies which indicated that violence was minimized and sometimes avoided when tactical squads were used to respond to armed confrontations.

Originally, ten volunteers, all experienced Force members, were selected to function as a five-member team with a reserve of personnel to call on.

Today, there are five TRU teams strategically located throughout the province who undergo monthly training. These sessions are intended to keep TRU personnel in a state of constant readiness by learning new and improved job skills and ways and means of accomplishing difficult tasks under a variety of situations.

When manpower studies indicated that TRU personnel would be necessary for the Olympic security operation, a training course was set up at CFB Petawawa, Ontario. This training included a wide variety of topics: firearms training, rappelling, camouflage and concealment, problem-solving exercises, the use of dim light observation equipment and first aid.

Hostage negotiators

All too often violent crimes are committed which involve the abduction of people. Recently, this has been witnessed in many parts of the world. An event such as the Olympics would provide a real opportunity for terrorist organizations to assert themselves and gain international prominence at the expense of innocent bystanders.

To combat this ever-present threat, the Ontario Provincial Police selected and trained four detective inspectors

from the Criminal Investigation Branch to act as "hostage negotiators".

Since no two hostage situations are identical, training in this area, sponsored by the RCMP in Montreal and Ottawa, consisted of relating techniques which had been successful in the past. These courses included information on contemporary terrorists groups, communications, criminal behaviour, the position of the police negotiator and negotiating techniques.

Exercise — Mount Olympus

In January, 1975, the DND and the Federal Solicitor General made a joint study of the Munich terrorist attack during the 1972 Olympics. This study revealed that while instructional manuals were issued and training seminars held by the various forces committed to Olympic security in Munich, German security forces did not undergo any type of events-simulation training. Hence, in preparation for the 1976 summer Olympics, the DND developed a series of 'conflict games' to test various aspects of Olympic security planning.

The series of 'conflict games' culminated in an exercise, code-named Mount Olympus, which was designed through "events simulations" to test all centres of responsibility at the municipal, provincial and federal levels and their communications/consultation mechanisms. Initial planning for Mount Olympus began in mid-September, 1975, with the actual event taking place April 5-8, 1976. The unique aspect of this exercise was that all security forces involved in the Olympics, either in Ontario or Quebec, as well as officials of the three levels of Government participated in a feat never before attempted.

The objectives of the exercise were realized. Not only did it show the participating agencies their direct responsibilities, but also it identified partner agency resources and channels of communication that were available should the need arise. It became obvious that any future planning for



Crowd Control Training



Firearms Training



TRU Team Training at CFB Petawawa.



Force equipment utilized for security operations



OPP SCUBA divers

events of Olympic magnitude must include simulated exercises of this nature.

Logistics

Never before in the history of Ontario Provincial Police operations had there been a need to transfer personnel and materiels in such quantity and over such distances to implement a security plan. Keeping in mind that more than 340 officers, 60 Force vehicles and several pieces of specialized equipment would be essential to task performance, it seemed obvious from the outset that the whole question of logistics would demand a great deal of attention and coordination.

Coordination was indeed the predominant characteristic of this entire exercise since the resources required

were spread over the whole province. To guarantee the proper support in this area Chief Superintendent W. J. Bolton was appointed as the co-ordinator for this task. A "Special Situations Planning Committee" was established as a decision-making body for logistical operations. This committee was also involved with the selection and training of security personnel.


While it is virtually impossible to record all the problems and solutions considered for this huge task, the final procedures which were employed should be briefly examined.

By far the greatest problem encountered was coordinating transportation of personnel. Since some members travelled by Force vehicles and others by private motor bus, it was necessary to devise schedules which

would guarantee transportation for each and every member of uniform and civilian support staff. This was accomplished by supplying schedules to drivers and passengers alike outlining departure points, departure times and routes. Because Force personnel had been selected from across the province it can readily be seen that many hours of planning were required.

The special equipment required for the Kingston activities was, for the main part, transported by Force Vehicles.

All watercraft required for marine duties were trailered to Kingston, except the "General Williams" from Midland and the "William H II" from Barrie. These two vessels sailed to Kingston via the Trent/Severn canal system.



Special Situations Planning Committee. (L. to R.) Mrs. D. Ellis, Deputy Commissioner L. R. Gartner, Commissioner H. H. Graham, C/Supt. W. J. Bolton, Assistant Commissioner N. K. McCombe (Ret'd), and Insp. J. Closs. (Far Right) Mr. J. Gibson, (Back to camera) C/Supt. A. T. Eady.

Operations

Consistent with many operations, the first day at Kingston was an orientation period for Force personnel. They were briefed on their new environment, the accommodation and facilities available to them.

Immediately following orientation, RCMP and OPP security specialists provided training for the joint security forces. This training included instruction on the overall security program with emphasis on the accreditation system which would be used in admitting security people, athletes, support staff, and various officials to either the Olympic Village or the Olympic Harbour. Sessions included videotapes and commentaries on terrorist groups and international terrorist attacks.

The intention of this training period was twofold. First it was to familiarize the members of the joint security forces with their duties, and secondly it was to create a keen awareness in the minds of each member of the reality of potential terrorist attacks on athletes or sites at Kingston. Terrorists had marred the Munich Olympics and they could be expected to try again, either at Kingston or Montreal.

Before the security operations at Kingston can be fully appreciated, the organizational control utilized to administer established security policy must be examined.

As stated earlier, the ultimate responsibility for athletes, support staff and site safety rested with the Solicitor General of Ontario, The Honourable John P. MacBeth. In an operational sense, however, the Provincial Coordinator, Assistant Commissioner K. W. Grice and the Assistant Coordinator, Staff Superintendent J. S. McBride, were the responsible field agents. They continually monitored both the administrative and tactical components of the overall operation.

Administration

Common to many organizational theories is the concept of delegating authority to on-site administrators. Obviously this was necessary at Kingston so that continuity and direction could be maintained and organizational goals achieved. With this in mind, the Ontario Provincial Police structured their security force in a manner similar to a "district organization," complete with administrators, supervisors, subordinates, various specialists and a clerical staff.

The on-site senior administrator for the Kingston security operation was Superintendent G. M. Keast, No. 9 District Headquarters, Belleville. As "Operations Commander", he was responsible for the day-to-day control of the security force.

To assist Superintendent G. M. Keast in this important task were several commissioned and non-commissioned officers, each performing tasks vital to the successful performance of the job.



Superintendent G. M. Keast,
Operations Commander



Administrative staff for Olympic Operations. (Front Row) Cpl. J. Healey, M. Harris, E. Burt, D. Ellis, C. Dunham, S. Lloyd, (Rear Row) S/Sgt. W. Farrell, Cpl. W. Edwards, Cpl. J. Hanna, J. Gibson, Cpl. R. Lawrenson, T/Sgt. R. Dowe, Insp. M. Speicher, Insp. J. Cutter, Insp. W. Coxworth, Supt. G. Keast and S/Maj. J. McCabe.

Olympic Village security

From security surveys, several peripheral and internal locations at the Village were identified as "security posts". Security personnel from the DND and the OPP were allocated to man these posts on a twenty-four hour basis; the military provided perimeter security and the OPP provided internal and access control security.

No one was allowed to enter the Village until his accreditation and personal effects were scrutinized by OPP security personnel. While this type of control proved to be time consuming and sometimes monotonous, everyone involved in these control measures — including the athletes appreciated the reasons behind these high security standards.

Olympic Harbour security

All "security posts" at the Harbour were manned continually by Ontario Provincial Police personnel. Access to the Harbour was controlled by the

same accreditation system used at the Village. No one entered the Harbour, either by land or water, unless they satisfied "security post" personnel that they were so authorized.

As mentioned earlier, the Harbour facilities featured a public promenade and restaurant located on the roof of the main building. This unprecedented characteristic of a maximum security area allowed the public to be very close to the competitors. Security for this area, therefore, was of crucial importance. Anyone wishing to enter this area of the complex walked through a metal detector passageway operated by OPP personnel.

The Olympic Command Post

The Olympic Command Post situated on Johnson Street in Kingston was the co-ordination centre for the Department of National Defence, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Ontario Provincial Police Force.

The express purpose of the com-

mand post was to co-ordinate all information for the Kingston security operation. Senior officers from the three security forces monitored security activities from this point, and in the event of a crisis they were ready to provide direction to assist in stabilization procedures. This post was in constant contact with the Security Co-ordination Centre in Montreal and all policing agencies in Ontario.

Four commissioned officers of the Ontario Provincial Police Force were positioned at the command post and served two functions. First, they were the Provincial Co-ordinator's appointed representatives who could act in his stead on routine matters, and secondly they were crisis-intervention officers or "hostage negotiators."

This post operated around-the-clock and was equipped with several pieces of sophisticated electronic equipment essential to any number of problem-solving situations.

Toronto Star Photo



DND Officers doing security duty in Olympic Village.



Lighting and fencing for Olympic Village.



Security personnel checking accreditation at entrance to Olympic Village.



Force security personnel checking the underside of a vehicle which is about to enter the Olympic Village compound.



TRU team personnel on point duty at Olympic Harbour.



Olympic Command Post
RCMP Detachment, Kingston



Force security personnel on duty at Olympic Village.

Water security

Water Security was the joint responsibility of the RCMP and the OPP, with support from the DND (Navy). The RCMP was given the task of policing the perimeter of the three race courses while the OPP was responsible for all areas outside the perimeter, together with the Kingston and Olympic Harbours. The OPP was also prepared to enter the race course area to look after criminal occurrences. Although it was not our prime function to be within the perimeter, both police forces assisted Rescue Command (Navy) in their arduous task, whenever requested, in rescue and towing operations.

From the period June 19 to July 11, Water Security Command Centre was located on board the RCMP patrol vessel "Moosomin II", since it was equipped with both RCMP and OPP radios. On July 12, this Command Centre relocated in the operations room of the guard ship, a destroyer anchored in the middle of the three race courses on an around-the-clock basis. Guard ship duties were shared by H.M.C.S. Annapolis and H.M.C.S. Saguenay. H.M.C.S. Nipigon was the command ship of the destroyer squadron. Both guard ships were equipped with RCMP, OPP, DND Rescue Command radios and RCMP video monitors. The warship's radar operational personnel, plotters and technicians were at the Force's constant disposal.

Olympic sailing activities officially commenced in Kingston, June 19, with the opening of the Olympic Village. Athletes were advised by the Olympic Organizing Committee that there would be water security for their practices from June 19 to July 12 inclusive. During this period eight RCMP vessels looked after the 27-mile perimeter of the race course area. Nine OPP boats were responsible for the Olympic Harbour, the inshore water area where most of the practices took place and all other areas outside the race course perimeter.

These vessels were manned by 22 handpicked, experienced OPP marine personnel, four of whom were Force divers doubling as crew members.

On July 13, Water Security Forces became fully operational with 28 RCMP perimeter vessels in addition to nine OPP boats.

Ninety naval personnel who had received special training by the RCMP and the OPP in Halifax last spring were sworn in as Special Constables for this event. Corporal J. Graham, No. 8 DHQ, Peterborough, represented our Force in Halifax and instructed these men in the Small Vessels Regulations and Boating Restrictions Regulations of the Canada Shipping Act, boating offences under the Criminal Code and the Ontario Liquor Licence Act.

A typical day in the life of an OPP marine member began with reporting to Crawford Wharf each morning. Here he performed boat maintenance along with other crew members. He then attended a briefing at 0800 hours where senior personnel briefed him on matters relating to his upcoming tour of duty and latest intelligence reports.

Following the briefing, all craft left the harbour and took up pre-determined positions to perform "sweep" operations. This operation

required all craft to be abreast of one another and in one "sweeping" action check the corridor between the harbour and the race site. Once this activity was completed each craft was positioned in its designated area and commenced patrol procedures which included checking boats before they reached the perimeter vessels and carrying out any task given them by the Water Security Commander. These tasks might include transporting personnel to and from the DND guard ship, checking out distant radar contacts and performing VIP escorts.

At the conclusion of each race day a second "sweep" action was conducted covering the race site and the water corridor to the Olympic Harbour. This feature of the Water Security Operation ensured that no sailors were left stranded on the race course.

Following this second "sweep", all marine craft returned to Crawford Wharf. While the captains of each craft attended a debriefing session, other crew members performed duties relating to craft security, refueling, and repairs. This, however, was not the end of the day for water security operations, since each day either a RCMP vessel or an OPP vessel patrolled the waters of Kingston Harbour and the Olympic race course areas until 2300 hours.



OPP watercraft preparing for 'Sweep Operation'.

Airspace security

Airspace security was maintained by Canadian Forces (CF) surveillance flights. Radar coverage was provided from 0600 to 2200 hours daily. All surveillance flights were controlled by a mobile military radar unit located at Norman Rogers Airport, Kingston.

The 434th Squadron Detachment flying CF5 aircraft out of Canadian Forces Base, Trenton, maintained a high level surveillance posture and was available for armed interception if required.

The 424th Squadron flying Buffalo aircraft which was also based at C.F.B. Trenton provided visual surveillance and identification of intruder aircraft within the Positive Control Zone and above the Olympic Procedures area. Flights were carried out daily.

The 427th Tactical Helicopter Squadron fulfilled several roles: resupply of all military installations; airlift resources to move the military stand-by company on a twenty-four hour basis to any area within the task force boundaries; command and liaison aircraft to the Commander of Task Force 4 and the Provincial Coordinator; loudspeakers and a night landing capability; airborne surveillance to the RCMP and OPP and aerial escort to high risk convoys when required.

Security intelligence

Intelligence teams were located at the Harbour, the Village, the Command post and other Olympic related areas. Their information was coordinated on a daily basis by the Support Services Commander, who reported directly to the Security Co-ordinator, Assistant Commissioner K. W. Grice.

One of the five units provided personal security for VIP's and visiting dignitaries. At times this particular team worked as an isolated force and on other occasions it functioned as part of a coordinated force which included RCMP personnel.

Although there were occasions when intelligence sources indicated potential problems, it was fortunate

that no major incidents occurred. This might suggest that no acts of aggression were planned; it might also suggest that effective security proves a sound deterrent.



(Lower Left) Victoria Hall, (Upper Right) Olympic Village.



Buffalo aircraft from Canadian Forces Base, Trenton, on Air Security Patrol over Olympic sites.

Tactical Rescue Unit

The main responsibility of the TRU teams was to handle any emergency situation which might arise, requiring the assistance of police personnel specially trained in tactical and rescue operations. To ensure that a unit was available on a twenty-four hour basis, the TRU teams were assigned on-site duties. They provided security for Victoria Hall, where the majority of OPP personnel and some RCMP and DND members were billeted during the Olympic period.

Because people other than security personnel used Victoria Hall, strict security measures could not be effectively applied; however, the mere presence of these specially trained

officers surely served as a deterrent to any subversive element or terrorist organization.

Quick Response Team

The majority of duties assumed by the Ontario Provincial Police Force were of a static nature; therefore, it was deemed necessary to assemble a group of men, fully equipped and capable of instant mobility to respond to any emergent situation. A thirty-man squad called the "Relief Platoon", patrolled the city of Kingston in zones and was available as a first-line resource to the Operations Commander. This squad was in constant readiness to be called on for crowd control or to assist the TRU teams in the apprehension of dangerous criminals.

TRU Team



Bomb Disposal Unit

Bomb disposal teams provided 24 hour coverage with a "back-up" capability of all "off duty" teams. The Leigh-Marsland Engineering Firm supplied a vapour trace detector to augment our capability to locate, recover and dispose of suspect items.

Close liaison was maintained with the military's Explosives Ordnance Disposal teams (EOD) during the period of the games, and when circumstances allowed, operational training was carried out with them. Fortunately, no bomb incidents occurred during the games.



Bomb disposal unit

Escort of Athletes

An excellent example of inter-agency cooperation lies in the escort arrangements for athletes. The Ontario Provincial Police and the air-element of the DND worked closely and effectively in providing these security arrangements. Security escorts were provided for sailors participating at Kingston and soccer players competing at Toronto and Ottawa.

Three levels of security were established for these activities: "minimum", "medium" and "maximum". The security posture required for each escort was dictated by "threat assessment" profiles which were compiled on each participating country by The Olympic Organizing Committee. "Intelligence" on this subject was provided by international agencies, including the RCMP.

A high level of liaison was required during "maximum" security escorts, when air surveillance by the DND supported OPP ground security manoeuvres.

While coordination and planning for these activities actually took place at Kingston, field personnel in No. 5 and No. 11 Districts provided resources on several occasions which were vital to the success of the operations.

Community Services Unit, (L. to R.) Front Row: Cpl. C. D. MacDonell, Chief Insp. F. R. Blucher, Prov. Const. J. E. Brooks, Middle Row: Prov. Consts. J. E. Gilpin, F. J. Carriere, G. W. Brunton, Upper Left: Prov. Const. A. R. Dobie.



Community services

The Community Services unit, operating from the Olympic Village, was an

essential part of the Force's security organization. It was responsible for liaison with all media, providing both oral and written reports for the many press inquiries received daily.

The effectiveness of this particular unit was reflected by the media itself when the Kingston Whig Standard, Wednesday, July 14, 1976, commented, "Reporters are almost unbelieving at the genuine helpful attitude of the community service policemen. Information comes freely, telephone calls are promptly returned and the officers willingly track down contacts and arrange interviews." This helpful, courteous attitude was displayed by all OPP members at Kingston and prompted many similar remarks from visitors and the press alike.

O.P.P. Liaison Office — Montreal

Located just a few blocks from the main Olympic stadium in Montreal, was a small detachment of OPP officers. This detachment, consisting of four bilingual members, was located with Quebec security forces in the "Olympic Security Co-ordination Centre".

The purpose of this unit was to co-ordinate the efforts of the OPP Security Force and its Quebec counterparts should a crisis situation arise which demanded joint action. This detachment, also funnelled "intelligence" information on the Quebec security operations to the Ontario Security Forces, and provided liaison between the security forces of both provinces on a day to day basis.



OPP Liaison Office — Montreal,
(Foreground) Cpl. J. W. McGrath,
S/Sgt. H. Kostuck.

OPP Liaison Office — Montreal.
Seated at OPP centre: Prov. Const.
Danielle Bouchard.



The Royal Visit

As part of the North American Royal Tour, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II officially opened the XXI Olympiad in Montreal on July 17. Accompanying her were H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh and H.R.H. Prince Andrew.

Following the opening ceremonies, the Royal Family sailed on the Royal Yacht Britannia to Kingston, Ontario to view Olympic sailing events.

The security operation required to guarantee the safety of the Royal Family in Ontario was just as extensive and complex as security arrangements for the athletes at Kingston. From the moment the Royal Yacht entered Ontario waters, a constant and vigilant security network requiring large concentrations of manpower and equipment was activated.

An escort for the Britannia was provided as it sailed up the St. Lawrence from the Quebec/Ontario border. Personnel and equipment from the OPP, the DND, the RCMP, and the St. Regis Police Force were used in this joint effort. The "General Williams", an OPP launch normally based at Midland, was an escort vessel for the Britannia during the Ontario visit.

Because the Royal Yacht was sailing in both Canadian and American waters during the visit, security personnel from the New York State Police and the United States Secret Service were stationed on board the RCMP command vessel, "Standoff", along with OPP personnel. These forces were required to maintain a constant legal jurisdiction in case of emergencies. Whenever the Britannia sailed in American waters, the United States Coast Guard provided additional security services.

During daylight hours air surveillance was constantly in operation in the vicinity of the Royal flotilla, utilizing an OPP JetRanger helicopter. On the American side, a New York State Police helicopter was used.

In addition to air and water security, an OPP cruiser manned by two officers travelled along Highway #2



Queen arrives at Crawford Wharf.


Queen at Upper Canada Village.



*The Queen arrives at Olympic Village.
Prov. Const. K. E. Eckart saluting.*



*Commissioner H. H. Graham is presented
to Queen Elizabeth II.*



parallel to the Royal Yacht. Their presence supplied a response unit to any subversive activity that might be initiated from shore.

At approximately 10 a.m., Tuesday, July 20, the Royal flotilla arrived at Kingston and anchored offshore. On board the Britannia the Queen received greetings from various federal and provincial government officials including the Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario, the Honourable Pauline McGibbon, and Premier William Davis. Following the official welcome, the Queen received Olympic officials.

The Royal Yacht then moved into position near the Olympic race course where the Queen viewed the sailing events. A VIP luncheon hosted by the Queen followed on board the Britannia.

At 4 p.m. the Queen, the Duke of Edinburgh and Prince Andrew left the Britannia by Royal Barge and landed at Crawford Wharf, where they were greeted by provincial and municipal government officials, including the Mayor of Kingston, George Speal, Q.C. The Royal party

then travelled by motorcade to the Olympic Yachting Centre at Olympic Harbour. Enthusiastic crowds lined the streets despite persistent rain.

At the Yachting Centre the Queen was greeted by Colonel C. W. (Cam) Jones, (retired), Director General of Yachting. His attractive 16-year-old daughter, Sandra Jones, was on hand to guide Prince Andrew around the Centre. Various Olympic competitors and officials attended a reception at the Centre, hosted by the Olympic Organizing Committee. Guests included Deputy Solicitor General A. A. Russell, Q.C., Assistant Commissioner K. W. Grice and Staff Superintendent J. S. McBride.

Following the reception the Royal Party returned to Crawford Wharf. The Queen rejoined the Britannia while the Duke of Edinburgh and Prince Andrew continued on to visit the Royal Military College of Canada. Here Prince Philip presented Duke of Edinburgh Awards for scholastic and athletic achievement to several students from all over Canada. Following the ceremony the Duke of

Edinburgh and Prince Andrew returned to the Britannia.

The Queen's state dinner aboard the Britannia that evening was imposing and exclusive. Guests included Governor General Jules Léger, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, the ten Provincial Lieutenant-Governors of Canada and the ten Provincial Premiers. Such a concentrated gathering of important officials was a security responsibility indeed.

At midnight the Royal flotilla weighed anchor for Upper Canada Village near Morrisburg, Ontario. Inclement weather, however, prompted changes in the Royal itinerary and security forces had to switch to contingency plans. The Royal Family, instead of proceeding directly to Upper Canada Village, rode in an escorted motorcade from the Iroquois Lock to Chrysler Marina where the original itinerary was then re-implemented.

The sudden change of itinerary obviously posed security problems, but thanks to the Security Planning Committee's foresight and quick response of officers on-the-job, all went well.

Rarely are contingency plans ever used, but they must exist in any security operation. This was one of the rare times when a backup procedure was needed, and it went off without a hitch.

The Duke of Edinburgh flew via Canadian Forces helicopter from Iroquois to Bromont, Quebec, to open the Olympic Equestrian events. Princess Anne was competing as a member of the British equestrian team.

At Chrysler Marina, meanwhile, the tightly scheduled Royal Tour continued. The Queen and Prince Andrew were met by Premier W. G. Davis and Mrs. Davis and the Minister of National Revenue, Mr. J. S. G. Cullen. Premier Davis presented several Ontario government officials to the Queen, including Commissioner H. H. Graham of the Ontario Provincial Police Force. Following presentations the Royal Party left by motorcade for Upper Canada Village.

Queen Elizabeth II and HRH The Duke of Edinburgh with the Mayor of Kingston, G. Speal, Q.C. and Premier W. G. Davis.



Hundreds of enthusiastic people had lined up since the dark, early hours of morning, to catch a glimpse of the Royal Party. Her Majesty and Prince Andrew received a warm personal welcome. At the village, St. Lawrence Parks Commission officials were introduced to the Queen. The Royal Party enjoyed glimpses into Ontario's historic past in the numerous 19th-century buildings where pioneer crafts are demonstrated and Victorian life is re-enacted.

From the Village staff, dressed in period costume, Her Majesty received gifts: a quilt specially handsewn in the old style for the occasion, and the first copy printed of the Upper Canada Village newspaper, the Gazette. The Gazette was especially appropriate as it featured a reprint of an account of the visit to Brockville, Ontario, in 1860 by the then Prince of Wales.

Among demonstrations of pioneer activities, Prince Andrew was particularly fascinated by the hand hewing of logs for period architecture.

After viewing several buildings and exhibits the Royal Party returned by motorcade to Chrysler Marina and then by Royal Barge to the Britannia.

On board the Britannia, the Queen hosted an official luncheon. In attendance were Lieutenant-Governor Pauline McGibbon and Mr. McGibbon, Premier William Davis and Mrs. Davis, Commissioner H. H. Graham and other provincial dignitaries. After lunch the Royal Party sailed for Quebec under normal escort.

In every aspect the Royal Visit was a success. It was the culmination of more than a year spent on intensive joint force planning. All members of the Force who participated in the operation may rightfully take pride in a job well done.

The Future

Is there to be a future for the Olympic Games as we know them?

The venue of the 1980 Games is set — Moscow, U.S.S.R. Russian security personnel, including Boris Shumilin, who will be in charge of Olympic security, attended both Kingston and Montreal to view security operations.

Assistant Commissioner Ken Grice, speaking to a Kingston reporter, said, "The Soviets might not have to mount such a large-scale security operation because they already have considerable security." The difficulty of obtaining access to the country and the controlled movement while in the country will weigh in favour of the 1980 security efforts. But what of 1984?

Canada's high state of preparedness resulted from the Munich Tragedy. Ten members of the Israeli Olympic team died. Dr. Manfred

Schreiber, President of Police in Munich, Germany, spoke of his role in the Olympic security program at a San Antonio, Texas, conference of police chiefs. "The terrorist Kamikaze mentality cannot be halted," he said, "we have to realize this."

We will never know whether the joint forces security endeavours thwarted terrorists or if they chose not to strike at the Games. Nevertheless, the type of warfare they have waged continues; the officials in top security positions at the 1984, 1988 and 1992 Games must be prepared to confront, foil and defeat the organized international terrorist.

The extent and cost of security operations for the Olympic Games bring into doubt whether or not there will be Games in the future. If they proceed, the expertise of the Canadian joint security forces will be available to the world as an example of leadership in security operations.



(L. to R.) Prov. Const. W. Nethery — TRU Team member, Assistant Commissioner K. W. Grice and Boris Shumilin — Chairman of the Soviet Union's Commission on Security for the 1980 Olympics.

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